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THEOPHRASTUS AND THE INTELLECT AS MIXTURE
By Myrna Gabbe, University of Dayton

De Anima III 5 introduces one of Aristotle’s most perplexing doctrines. In this
short and obscure chapter, Aristotle distinguishes between an intellect that becomes all
things, the so-called potential intellect, and an intellect that makes all things, the so-called
productive intellect (430a14-15). It is generally held that the intellect that becomes all
things is described in De Anima III 4, since Aristotle there tells us that the intellect knows
by becoming its objects (429a15-18). This intellect has acquired the title “potential
intellect” since it must be potentially the objects of thought in order to become and think
the objects of thought (429a18-24). But scholars do not agree on what these intellects
are, what they do or how they relate to each other. The main point of contention arises
with respect to the productive intellect’s mode of existence – in particular, whether it is
transcendent or immanent. This paper concerns Theophrastus’ interpretation of De
Anima III 4 and 5, because those familiar with his writings tend to agree that he holds the
key to resolving this twenty-three hundred year old debate.1
Why think that Theophrastus can help us to understand Aristotle’s De Anima?
Theophrastus (ca. 371- ca. 287 B.C.E.) was Aristotle’s pupil and named successor as head
of the Lyceum. Remaining accounts indicate that he was Aristotle’s close friend and
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For exceptions to this position, cfr. P. HUBY, Stages in the Development of Language
About Aristotle's Nous, in H. BLUMENTHAL and H. ROBINSON (edd.), Aristotle and the Later
Tradition, Oxford 1991, pp. 129-30 and H. BLUMENTHAL, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late
Antiquity, Ithaca 1996, pp. 10-11. Huby is skeptical that Theophrastus had “privileged access” to
the thoughts of Aristotle on matters of the intellect, while Blumenthal took Theophrastus’
questions as an expression of genuine puzzlement.
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associate.2 We have reason, then, to suppose that he was privy to Aristotle’s thoughts on
the matter of the intellect. Furthermore, most scholars believe that Theophrastus’
intention in writing his On the Soul was to elucidate Aristotle’s views. Therefore,
because Theophrastus places the productive intellect squarely in the human soul, it is held
that Aristotle did too. This, in any case, is the position of Paul Moraux,3 Edmund
Barbotin,4 Daniel Devereux5 and John Rist6. They take Theophrastus’ writings on the
intellect as sound evidence against the view that the productive intellect is purely
transcendent and identical to a higher being. This view was first put forward by
Alexander of Aphrodisias and is currently enjoying a revival.7

2

For testimonies regarding the relationship of Aristotle and Theophrastus cfr. W.W.
FORTENBAUGH, P. HUBY, R. SHARPLES, and D. GUTAS (edd.), Theophrastus of Eresus:
Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, I, Leiden 1992.
3
P. MORAUX, Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote, Liège and Paris
1942, p.5. Here Moraux remarks that Theophrastus is the most faithful of interpreters.
4
E. BARBOTIN, La théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste, Louvain and
Paris, 1954, p. 241: « Notre analyse des fragments a poursuivi un double effort de hardiesse et de
fidélité : de hardiesse, pour rejoindre, au delà de textes laconiques et discontinus, la pensée
vivante dont ils témoignent ; de fidélité aussi à respecter les intentions et les silences de l’auteur.
Nous ne prétendons pas avoir toujours su résoudre l’antinomie d’une telle entreprise : il suffirait
d’avoir attiré l’attention sur des documents de première main, qui apportent aux déclarations
d’Aristote de substantiels compléments. »
5
D. DEVEREUX, Theophrastus on the Intellect, in W. W. FORTENBAUGH and D. GUTAS
(edd.), Theophrastus, His Psychological, Doxographical, and Scientific Writings, New
Brunswick 1992, pp. 32-43. Devereux remarks on pp. 32-3: “Theophrastus’ aporiai are designed
not so much to challenge as to clarify Aristotle’s views. If clarification was indeed his aim, then
we have all the more reason to look to these fragments for help in deciphering Aristotle’s cryptic
messages concerning the intellect.”
6
J. RIST, Notes on Aristotle De Anima 3. 5, « Classical Philology » LXI (1966) pp. 8-20.
On pp. 8-9, Rist appeals to Theophrastus as evidence for Aristotle’s intent, taking for granted his
authority.
7
Cfr., for instance, E. HARTMAN, Substance, Body, and Soul, Princeton 1977; C. KAHN,
The Role of Nous in the Cognition of First Principles in Posterior Analytics II 19, in E. BERTI
(ed.), Aristotle on Science: The Posterior Analytics, Padua 1981, pp. 385-414; J. HALDANE,
Aquinas and the Active Intellect, « Philosophy » LXVII (1992) pp. 119-210; M. FREDE, La
théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect agent, in G. R. DHERBEY (ed.), Corps et Âme, Paris 1996,
pp. 375-90; V. CASTON, Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal, « Phronesis » XLIV
(1999) pp. 199-227; M. WHITE, The Problem of Aristotle's Nous Poiêtikos, « Review of
Metaphysics » LVII (2004) pp. 725-40.

2

Theophrastus’ writings on the intellect are now lost, but portions are preserved
mainly by Priscian of Lydia (ca. 6th c. C.E.) in his metaphrase On Theophrastus On
Sense-Perception [Metaphr.],8 and by Themistius (ca. 317- ca. 388 C.E.) in his
paraphrase of Aristotle’s De Anima [In de an.]. What remains is a fair bit, enough to say
that his noetic theory is encapsulated by one fragment preserved by Themistius: “the
intellect is in a way a mixture out of the productive and the potential” (108,22-23).
Despite differences in the details of what is mixed and how, scholars generally take the
descriptions ‘mixed’ (miktov") and ‘mixture’ (mivxi") to reference duality, division
and differentiation – to indicate either that Theophrastus recognized two types of
intellects or that he distinguished between two kinds of noetic faculties. This treatment
of Theophrastus corresponds with and lends support to a widely accepted reading of De
Anima, whereby chapters four and five of book three are taken to describe either two
kinds of intellects present in the human soul or two functionally discrete parts of a single
intellect.

8

We do have references to Theophrastus in the works of Arabic and Latin medieval
philosophers, but it is unlikely that the medieval philosophers had the texts of Theophrastus
available to them in translation. The views of Theophrastus were usually yoked to those of
Themistius, and since there was an Arabic and Latin translation of Themistius’ paraphrase and
since Priscian is not mentioned by the medieval philosophers, we can assume that their
knowledge of Theophrastus comes from the quotes preserved by Themistius. See the following
two articles by D. Gutas on the transmission of Greeks texts into Arabic: D. GUTAS, The Life,
Works, and Sayings of Theophrastus in the Arabic Tradition, in W.W. FORTENBAUGH, P.
HUBY and A. LONG (edd.), Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Work, New Brunswick and
Oxford 1985, pp. 63-102; D. GUTAS, The Starting Point of Philosophical Studies in Alexandrian
and Arabic Aristotelianism, in W.W. FORTENBAUGH, P. HUBY and A. LONG (edd.),
Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Work, New Brunswick and Oxford 1985, pp. 115-23.
In the same volume, P. Huby argues that the medieval philosophers had a second text by
Themistius, which also served as a source for Theophrastus. P. HUBY, Medieval Evidence for
Theophrastus' Discussion of the Intellect, in W.W. FORTENBAUGH, P. HUBY and A. LONG
(edd.), Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Work, New Brunswick and Oxford 1985, pp.
165-81.
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If we could be confident both that Theophrastus was privy to Aristotle’s thoughts
on the intellect and that his intention was to clarify his more obscure doctrines, we could
rule out certain interpretations of the De Anima as implausible and focus our attention on
Theophrastus’ writings. However, these two assumptions are contentious. It is not
obvious that Theophrastus had knowledge of Aristotle’s doctrines on the intellect beyond
the texts we share. Pamela Huby, who doubts that Theophrastus had privileged access to
Aristotle’s thoughts on this matter, observes that he “makes no claim to know what
Aristotle thought independently of what he wrote down, and is as puzzled as we are about
what his master meant.”9 This latter point makes reference to the questions Theophrastus
raises in the course of articulating an account of the intellect. The queries are generally
thought to serve a pedagogical function – or, in the words of Devereux, “to anticipate the
sorts of misunderstandings and questions a reader is likely to have.”10 The fragments,
however, do not conclusively show this to be the case. Because the text is fragmented,
we do not have the full responses to his queries; hence, we cannot presume to know how
or even that he had answered all of them. Furthermore, it is not evident that
Theophrastus intended only to clarify Aristotle’s theory of the intellect and not modify or
reject certain aspects of it. It would not have been out of Theophrastus’ character to
modify and abandon certain doctrines that he believed did not advance the Aristotelian
program. It has been argued, for instance, that Theophrastus rejected Aristotle’s fifth
element (aether), his theory of place, and the prime mover.11 Moreover, Theophrastus’

9

P. HUBY, Stages in the Development of Language About Aristotle's Nous, cit., p.129.
D. DEVEREUX, Theophrastus on the Intellect, cit., p. 32.
11
For an account of both ancient and contemporary assessments of Theophrastus see R.
SHARPLES, Theophrastus as Philosopher and Aristotelian, in J. M. van OPHUIJSEN and M. van
RAALTE (edd.), Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources, New Brunswick 1998, pp. 267-80.
10
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description of the intellect is in marked contrast with Aristotle’s claim that the intellect is
unmixed (ajmighv") (429a18, 24; 430a18).
Since we do not possess testimony from Theophrastus regarding his intentions or
knowledge, to assess these interpretive assumptions we must investigate what is meant by
the remark that the intellect is a mixture. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to
unpack and clarify Theophrastus’ noetic theory in the interest of assessing him as a
commentator of Aristotle. Contrary to the received view, I shall argue that ‘mixture’ is
applied to the intellect to emphasize its uniformity and lack of differentiation.12 But it is
my view that we can learn little from Theophrastus about Aristotle’s intentions.
Theophrastus, I contend, arrives at his conception of the intellect by modifying or,
perhaps in his mind, rejecting certain of Aristotle’s doctrines.

II
The description of the intellect as a mixture appears only in Themistius’
paraphrase, but there is little reason to doubt that it comes from Theophrastus’ treatise.13
Although Priscian’s metaphrase omits the references to mixture, it ends abruptly before a
treatment of De Anima III 5 with a note from the copyist that reads: “look out for the
12

Cfr. P. HUBY, Stages in the Development of Language About Aristotle's Nous, cit. Huby
arrives at a similar conclusion in this paper by analyzing the noetic language used by the
Peripatetic commentators. According to Huby, noetic division and differentiation appear only
after Theophrastus. Although ‘mixture’ would seem to denote plurality and differentiation, Huby
does not address this description of Theophrastus.
13
Interestingly, the Stoics, who were corporealists, used the notion of a mixture to explain
the relationship between the body and soul. This view is generally attributed to Chrysippus (ca.
280-207 B.C.E.), who was born after Theophrastus died, but Arcesilaus (ca. 315-240 B.C.E.)
reportedly attacked the Stoic account of mixture, making it possible that the theory originated
with Zeno, who was active during Theophrastus’ life. Cfr. PLUTARCH, comm. not. 1078B-D.
Hence, the Stoics may have already applied the word ‘mixture’ to the soul when Theophrastus
wrote his treatise. It is unlikely that Theophrastus inspired the Stoic theory, since their corporeal
conception of the soul demanded a physical account of how the soul relates to the body.
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rest.” We can assume, then, that we do not have the complete text and that a discussion
of the intellect as mixture is yet to come.
Themistius records two passages wherein the notion of the intellect as mixture
appears. The first passage is introduced to show that Theophrastus had the same
concerns as he regarding the final remark of De Anima III 5, which reads, “We do not
remember because this is impassive, but the passive intellect (oJ paqhtiko;"
nou'") is perishable and without this it thinks nothing” (430a23-25). Theophrastus
reportedly wrote:
For if the potentiality is like a disposition, if it was connate with that, it must have
been so both immediately and always: but if (it came) later, with what, and in
what way, was its coming to be? Certainly it appears to be uncreated, if it is
indestructible. But since it is immanent, why is it not always? Why are there
forgetting and deception? Perhaps through the mixture (h] dia; th;n
mi'xin).14 (In de an. 102,26-29 = 320B FHS&G)
The second passage is part of a larger quote tacked on to the end of Themistius’ excursus
of De Anima III 4 and 5. Themistius has just made reference to Plato and turns to
Theophrastus for the final bit of support. The relevant portion runs as follows:
What are these two natures? And what again is what underlies or is united to the
productive? For the intellect is in a way a mixture out of the productive and the
potential (mikto;n gavr pw" oJ nou'" e[k te tou' poihtikou'
kai; tou' dunavmei). If then the motive (intellect) is connate, it must have
been so both immediately and always; but if (it came) later, with what, and in
what way, was its coming to be? Certainly it appears to be uncreated, if it is also
indestructible. But since it is immanent, why is it not always? Why are there
forgetting and deception and falsehood? Perhaps through the mixture (h] dia;
th;n mi'xin). (In de an. 108,22-8 = 320A FHS&G)

14

Without only minor modifications, translations of fragments are from W.
FORTENBAUGH, P. HUBY, R. SHARPLES, D. GUTAS (edd.), Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources
for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, Part Two, Leiden 1992. For ease of reference, I
shall henceforth refer to the fragments by the numbers assigned to them in this sourcebook.
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Notice that ‘mixture’ appears once in passage 320B and twice in 320A. The first use of
the term in 320A describes the intellect’s character: The intellect, we are told, is a
mixture of the potential and productive, where the potential underlies or is united to the
productive.15 The context of the second appearance of ‘mixture’ in 320A is virtually
identical with the context in which it appears in 320B – the two passages differ mostly in
their opening lines.16 Having argued that the intellect is connate, invoking mixture
answers the questions, “Why is it not always?” and “Why are there forgetting and
deception and falsehood?” Scholars take the query “Why is it not always?” as a
reference to the problem Aristotle mentions at the end of De Anima III 4 – namely, why
we do not always think (430a5-6). That the intellect is a mixture of what is productive
and potential explains the intermittence and fallibility of human intellection.17
The difficulty for interpreters of Theophrastus is to understand how the term
‘mixture’ applies to the intellect, when strictly speaking only corporeal bodies can be
mixed. We can assume Theophrastus to use the word in an extended or analogical sense.
Indeed, he indicates that the human intellect is not a genuine mixture by qualifying the
description with the adverb pw": The intellect, he says, is somehow a mixture. The task
for scholars is to determine in what way the intellect is like a mixture of corporeal
entities.

15

For an interesting discussion of sunhrth'sqai see P. HUBY and D. GUTAS,
Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Commentary Vol.
4, Psychology, Leiden 1999, pp. 184-5.
16
It is questionable whether fragments 320A and B are quotations of two separate passages,
since there is significant overlap between the two. Huby thinks it unlikely that Theophrastus
repeated his words twice. She speculates that “Themistius paraphrased a single passage of
Theophrastus twice, adapting the opening to suit his context.” P. HUBY, Commentary, cit. pp.
185-6.
17
I will question the notion that the mixture accounts for the intermittence of human intellect
in section IV.
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III
Ideally, an interpretation of fragments 320A and 320B should address why
Theophrastus describes the intellect as a mixture. It should explain what ‘mixture’ is
meant to underline. Moraux, for instance, thinks that the intellect is mixed insofar as it
has two functionally discrete parts – one that produces the intelligible forms, the other
that passively receives them.18 He does not explain, however, why this conception of the
intellect is aptly described by the term ‘mixture’ and for this reason his account is
unsatisfactory.19 (I will, nonetheless, address Moraux’s account in greater detail in
Section V.) By contrast, both Barbotin and Devereux aim to give an interpretation that
reflects Aristotle’s account of mixture, which is why I focus on their interpretations. On
the face of it, Devereux offers the more natural reading of the fragments. Not only is his
interpretation simpler than Barbotin’s, but Devereux also makes Theophrastus’ treatment
of the intellect conform more closely than Barbotin’s to Aristotle’s account of mixture.
But even if Barbotin’s interpretation is strained, it is revealing. It shows us what is wrong
with Devereux’s theory and hints at the problem besetting both accounts: the shared
assumption that the human intellect is a somehow a compound of two kinds of intellects,

Moraux’s interpretation of Theophrastus looks a lot like Aquinas’ interpretation of the De
Anima in that he takes passages 320A and 320B to describe an intellect with two faculties: one
productive, which produces the intelligible objects by dematerializing the intelligible form from
its material condition, the other potential and passive, which receives the forms. Not surprisingly,
Moraux commends the Thomist interpretation for respecting both the text and the Aristotelian
spirit more than any other. Cfr. P. MORAUX, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, cit., p. 5. R. D. Hicks
seems to read the fragments more or less in line with Moraux in that he takes the ‘mixture’ to
describe an intellect comprised of active and potential elements. Cfr. R. D. HICKS, Aristotle: De
Anima, Cambridge 1907, p. 595.
19
Moraux also fails to explain how this account of the mixture explains deception, falsehood
and forgetting.
18
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one whose nature is active, the other whose nature is potential and passive. The place to
begin is with Aristotle’s theory of mixture.
Aristotle’s account of mixture is detailed in book one, chapter ten of On
Generation and Corruption. He explains there that a mixture is a compound formed out
of two or more constituents that originally existed in separation (327b21-22). The
compound is not identical to any of the constituents, but rather is a unique third entity
different in actuality from its constituents (327b24-25). According to Aristotle, the
compound is formed when the combined constituents reciprocally alter such that each
lose their essential character and become something intermediate (328a28-31). The
constituents, however, are not destroyed in the process of being mixed, because the
destruction of either of one of them will not produce a compound that is some third thing.
Rather, the constituents persist within the compound potentially, so that should the
compound separate out, the constituents would regain their original form (327b25-26).
Because the constituents alter reciprocally, mixing produces a compound that is
uniform in quality – each portion has the same character as the next (327b4; 328a10-11;
328b21-22). Mixtures thus stand in contrast to combinations that result only in the
juxtaposition of their elements. The latter type of combination is produced because the
constituents are not altered by the presence of the other, like barley and wheat when
combined. Hence, while a group of juxtaposed entities exhibits division and
differentiation – not all parts are alike – a genuine mixture manifests uniformity (328a815).
Devereux’s interpretation of the intellect as mixture makes great use of the notion
that a mixture is a compound resulting from the reciprocal alteration of its constituents.

9

According to Devereux, the human intellect is a mixture of what I call the potential and
the productive intellects: it is a unique third intellect resulting from the combination of
two kinds of intellects. Because Devereux identifies the potential intellect with the
intellect Theophrastus describes as “belonging to the soul” (yuciko;" nou'",
Metaphr. 26,6 = 307B) and assumes it to stand in contrast with the intellect Theophrastus
describes as entering from without (In de an. 107,36 = 307A), he takes the potential
intellect to be inseparable from and perishable with the body. (Theophrastus, we might
note, makes no explicit connection between the potential intellect and the intellect
belonging to the soul.) Conversely, he presumes that the intellect entering from without
is the productive intellect and takes it to be capable of independent and separate
existence.20 This intellect, in his view, is characterized by its actuality. As he conceives
it, it is actual in its being, ceaseless in its activity, immortal and eternal. But the nature of
these two intellects changes when the productive intellect becomes a part of the human
soul.
Appealing to the reciprocal alteration that occurs with a genuine mixture,
Devereux argues that the productive and potential intellects are reciprocally changed “out
of their nature” when they meet: the potential intellect acquires actuality, the productive
intellect potentiality.21 Like a genuine mixture, the constituents preserve their original
character in potentiality, though only the productive intellect survives the dissolution of
the individual. The alteration, however, does not result in uniformity. As Devereux
understands it, the mixing of the two intellects produces a single intellect composed of

20

According to Theophrastus, the intellect that enters from without joins the human soul at
the first generation of the embryo, for otherwise it would be “as if added” (In de an. 107,31-37 =
307A).
21
DEVEREUX, Theophrastus on the Intellect, cit., p. 42.
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distinct functional parts that each play a role in the acquisition and contemplation of the
intelligible forms or objects. Thus although the productive intellect acquires some
potentiality, it remains principally active, operating as a disposition (wJ" e{vxi", In
de an. 102,26 = 320B) whose activity is intermittent. Likewise, after the mixing the
potential intellect retains its potential and passive nature insofar as its role is to receive
and be affected by intelligible forms. As Devereux explains, thinking, for Theophrastus,
takes place when the potential intellect receives or becomes the intelligible objects thanks
to the agency of the intelligible objects, which were actualized by the productive intellect.
(I will say more about this in section V.)
Devereux’s account has a seductive simplicity that belies a serious problem. It is
clear that Devereux takes the mixture to account for human intellection on the
assumption that an intellect whose nature is either purely potential or purely actual
cannot. An intellect whose nature is potential cannot produce intelligible objects for lack
of agency and, hence, cannot think by itself. Conversely, an intellect that is thoroughly
actual will always think, though human intellection is clearly intermittent. This
interpretation of the intellect as mixture assumes that Theophrastus read De Anima III 4
and 5 as describing two different kinds of noetic entities. However, the intellects, as
Devereux conceives them, cannot mix. As a mere potentiality, the potential intellect
lacks the actuality necessary for it to be a constituent of a mixture. A constituent of a
mixture must have separate and independent existence: it must be something actual.
Likewise, an intellect whose very being is actuality cannot alter and acquire potentiality
because suffering change, under Aristotle’s account, requires potentiality. This means

11

that neither of the two intellects, as Devereux understands them, can be mixed in any way
that resembles the physical process described in On Generation and Corruption.
Barbotin is careful to avoid the problems that beset Devereux’s interpretation by
denying (a) that the potential intellect can mix with the productive intellect as a pure
potentiality and (b) that the productive intellect is altered in its encounter with the human
soul.22 Doing so, however, makes for an exceedingly awkward account of the intellect as
mixture. Barbotin explains that prior to the productive intellect’s presence in the human
soul, the potential intellect is merely one potentiality among the ensemble of
potentialities belonging to the embryo.23 Therefore, it does not yet have the actuality to
be a constituent of a mixture. The productive intellect, he explains, “penetrates” the
vegetative and sensible soul – it does not mix with the human soul, because “mixture,”
we recall, is reserved for the relationship of the productive and potential intellects.24 The
mixing of these two intellects thus proceeds from the initial encounter of the productive
intellect and the vegetative and sensitive soul, an encounter which serves to create the
faculty for human intellection. “Its presence,” Barbotin writes, “awakens in the growing

22

Devereux criticizes Barbotin for maintaining that the productive intellect retains its
essence while in the human soul. However, he seems to have missed Barbotin’s reason for this
insistence. DEVEREUX, Theophrastus on the Intellect, cit., pp. 40-43.
23
Cfr. E. BARBOTIN, La théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste, cit., p.
199.
24
P. Merlan also takes there to be one intellect whose encounter with the vegetative and
sensitive soul explains the fallibility and intermittence of human cognition. As opposed to
Barbotin, however, who maintains that the ‘mixture’ applies to the relationship between the
potential and productive intellects, Merlan takes the ‘mixture’ to describe the relationship
between the intellect from without (the productive intellect?) and the vegetative and sensitive
soul. It is not clear how Merlan conceives the mixture of the productive intellect with the
sensitive soul when the productive intellect enters at the first generation of the embryo, prior to
the formation of the sensitive soul. Cfr. P. MERLAN, Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus,
in A. H. ARMSTRONG (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Medieval Philosophy,
Cambridge 1967, p. 109.
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being a new faculty: the potential intellect”.25 The potential intellect obtains actuality –
i.e., the power to actualize spontaneously intelligibles in an act of thought – thanks to the
presence of the productive intellect in the human soul. Thus pace Devereux, it is not, for
Barbotin, the productive intellect that actualizes intelligible forms. The productive
intellect remains a pure actuality, despite the mixing. Its activity does not become
intermittent, or liable to error and fatigue, because these traits belong to the human
intellect insofar as it admits potentiality.
Barbotin cleverly anticipates the problems with Devereux’s account, but try as he
might, he cannot explain how the relationship between the potential and productive
intellects is anything like a mixture. Barbotin maintains that the union of the two
intellects produces something analogous to an alteration of mixed bodies.26 Still, if the
potential intellect is not combined with the productive intellect and if the productive
intellect remains unaffected, it is hard to see how this union is in anyway analogous to a
mixing.27 It seems rather that the mixture, on Barbotin’s view, is constituted by the
productive intellect and the hylomorphic soul, since this union produces a third distinct
entity. But as Barbotin rightly notes, this is not how Theophrastus describes the mixture.
Regardless, how the embryo can be the source of the potential intellect is perplexing,
given (a) that the embryo is hardly in possession of a vegetative soul, let alone a sensitive

25

E. BARBOTIN, La théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste, cit., p. 199
writes: « En pénétrant dans l’embryon à l’origine de la vie, il y rencontre des énergies
physiologiques et psychiques – végétative et sensitives – issue du déterminisme biologique ; mais
sa présence éveille dans l’être en croissance une faculté toute nouvelle : l’intellect potentiel ;
celui-ci se trouve enveloppé, inclus dans l’ensemble de virtualités dont l’embryon est porteur. »
26
ID., p. 164.
27
I think because of this difficulty, Barbotin often writes as if the term ‘mixture’ is meant
simply to emphasize the productive and potential intellects’ intimate union. ID., pp. 155, 163 and
164.
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soul, and (b) Aristotle’s insistence that the intellect is not the product of biological
changes.28
It is doubtful that the problems illuminated by Barbotin’s interpretation can be
resolved as he imagined, by extending or manipulating the meaning of mixture. Rather,
the difficulties suggest that the problems facing Devereux’s and Barbotin’s account of the
intellect lies with their interpretive assumption that the human intellect is composed of
two distinct kinds of noetic entities. Still this is not yet to show that Theophrastus had no
such concept, for we cannot assume that he was aware of the difficulties just described.
So let us turn now to consider the fragments.

IV
Reading De Anima III 4 and 5 as distinguishing between two kinds of noetic
entities has long been a part of our interpretative tradition, so it is not surprising that
Devereux and Barbotin would find this distinction in Theophrastus. The evidence for this
interpretation comes principally from fragment 320A discussed in section II above.
Because this passage is so central to our discussion, it is useful to quote it again.
What are these two natures? And what again is what underlies (to;
uJpokeivmenon) or is united to (sunhrthmevnon) the productive? For the
intellect is in a way a mixture out of the productive and the potential (mikto;n
gavr pw" oJ nou'" e[k te tou' poihtikou' kai; tou'
dunavmei). If then the motive intellect (oJ kinw'n) is connate, it must have
been so both immediately and always ; but if (it came) later, with what, and in
what way, was its coming to be? Certainly it appears to be uncreated, if it is also
indestructible. But since it is immanent, why is it not always? Why are there
forgetting and deception and falsehood? Perhaps through the mixture (h] dia;
th;n mi'xin). (THEM. In de an. 108,22-8 = 320A FHS&G)
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The passage opens with the question “What are these two natures?” which is
reformulated in the next sentence, before Theophrastus makes a shift to a different,
presumably related, question regarding the immanency of the motive intellect.
Reformulated, the question is: “What underlies (to; uJpokeivmenon) or is united to
(sunhrthmevnon) the productive?” Theophrastus justifies this reformulation with the
notion of the intellect as mixture: “For the intellect is in a way a mixture out the
productive and the potential” (mikto;n gavr pw" oJ nou'" e[k te tou'
poihtikou' kai; tou' dunavmei).
Barbotin and Devereux assume Theophrastus here to distinguish between
different kinds of intellects for two reasons. First, the participles uJpokeivmenon and
sunhrthmevnon imply a relationship between two things: between (a) what underlies
or is united with the productive and (b) the productive. The subsequent reformulation in
terms of mixture makes clear that what underlies or is united with the productive is the
potential. Second, the reference to a motive intellect (oJ kinw'n) suggests that the
discussion in the second half of the passage addresses the productive active intellect,
since the agent of change cannot be potential. However, the assumption that the human
intellect is constituted by two opposing kinds of noetic entities is challenged by
Theophrastus’ rejection of the potential intellect – i.e., an intellect whose nature is
passive and potential.
Theophrastus’ critique of the potential intellect is a response to two remarks of De
Anima III 4: (i) the intellect has no nature of its own other than that of potentiality (mhd
j aujtou' ei\nai fuvsin mhdemivan ajll j h] tauvthn, o{ti
dunatov", 429a21-2) and (ii) the intellect is nothing before it thinks (oujqevn
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ejstin ejnergeiva/ tw'n o[ntwn pri;n noei'n, 429a24). On the face
of it, these remarks suggest that the intellect is a mere potentiality before it acquires
knowledge and thinks. Theophrastus, however, provides two arguments against this
view. Consider the following fragment preserved by Priscian. He writes:
Perhaps this too would be absurd, if the intellect has the nature of matter, being
nothing, but potentially all things. But it must not be taken in this way, nor of all
intellect, but it is necessary to make distinctions. Of what nature, then, <is it>,
and what is <the basis> of the distinction? For matter is not a ‘this something’
(ouj tovde ti), but intellect, if it is not like this, what else <would it be>? In
the case of the intellect belonging to the soul (ejpi tou' yusikou' nou'),
we must therefore also take “potentially” analogically (kata; ajnalogivan);
for it must be interpreted in relation to the intellect in actuality, that is, that which
is separate (wJ" ga;r pro;" to;n ejnergeiva/ nou'n,
toutevsti to;n cwristovn). (Metaphr. 26,1-7 = 307B FHS&G)
In the first part of the passage, Theophrastus argues that the intellect cannot have
the nature of matter or potentiality. From here he concludes that a distinction must be
drawn between an intellect that belongs to the soul (yusiko;" nou'") and an intellect
in actuality (ejnergeiva/ nou'"). Devereux and Barbotin take the distinction to
demarcate the productive and potential intellects. But Theophrastus’ remarks here do not
support this reading.
Theophrastus’ argument against the potential intellect takes for granted that
matter corresponds to potentiality, form to actuality and being. It assumes that while the
form of an entity accounts for its being a tovde ti – a “this something” or a certain
kind of thing – its matter is only potentially a tovde ti – potentially a certain kind of
thing. The argument, then, is that if the intellect has the nature of matter – if it is no
actual being, but is all things potentially – then the intellect is a tovde ti only
potentially. However, Theophrastus insists that the intellect must be an actual tovde
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ti: “What else would it be?” Thus, he concludes that the intellect with potentiality is
something and, therefore, that is has a nature and actuality.29
According to Barbotin and Devereux, the critique of the potential intellect in the
first half of the passage and the distinction in the second anticipates the account of the
intellect in terms of mixture. It is for this reason that they take the distinction between
“the intellect belonging to the soul” and “the intellect in actuality” to be the distinction
between the potential and productive intellects respectively. Yet Theophrastus’ critique
of the potential intellect rules out the possibility that “the intellect belonging to the soul”
and “the intellect in actuality” refer to the potential and productive intellects respectively.
Simply put, Theophrastus does not recognize an intellect whose nature is potential.
The argument of 307B demonstrates that the potential intellect violates the
principle of non-contradiction. It shows that an intellect whose nature is potential is an
actual tovde ti insofar as it is an intellect, but not an actual tovde ti insofar as it
has a potential nature. Hence, the argument precludes its postulation, even as a
theoretical notion, and that is why subsequent to this argument Theophrastus provides us
with a different way of conceiving the intellect possessed of potentiality. “It is
necessary,” he writes, “to make distinctions” in order to articulate the nature and
character of the intellect manifesting potentiality. We must distinguish between an
intellect belonging to the soul and an intellect in actuality, because “we must take
‘potentially’ <said of the intellect belonging to the soul> analogically” – i.e., in relation
or in contrast to the intellect in actuality and not as matter. Given, then, the argument

29

This is how Priscian interprets Theophrastus. Regarding the intellect described in III 4,
the intellect that is connected to the soul, Priscian reports that it manifests both potentiality and
actuality. According to Priscian, this intellect has a form and is active by itself (Metaphr. 26,1214)
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against the potential intellect in the first part of the passage, we can assume that the
intellect belonging to the soul is already, in Theophrastus’ mind, mixed: it has actuality.
Therefore, the intellect belonging to the soul is neither an intellect whose nature is
potential, as Devereux imagines, nor a potentiality of an embryo, as Barbotin envisions.
The distinction between “the intellect belonging to the soul” and “the intellect in
actuality” is better understood as the distinction between the human and the divine.
In case the argument of 307B did not convince his readers that there cannot be an
intellect whose nature is potential, Theophrastus provided a second argument. This
argument, also recorded by Priscian, runs as follows:
For if it is when it is active that it becomes things, and at that time it is most both
<intellect and things>, things and intellect would be one and the same…If, then,
when it is things, then it is also intellect, intellect and things would be one and the
same. Is it the case, then, that when it is not thinking, not being things it is also
not intellect (o{tan mh; noh/', mh; w]n ta;; pravgmata oujde;
nou'" ejstin)? (Metaphr. 29,18-23 = 311 FHS&G)
For it is absurd…if existing potentially it (the intellect) is nothing, but in activity
it is something other (than itself), when it does not think itself, and through
thinking one thing and another is never the same (oujdevpote oJ
aujtov"). For this is a kind of undiscriminating and disorderly nature
(a[krito" gavr ti" au{th ge kai; a[takto" hJ fuvsi").
(Metaphr. 30,22-25 = 312 FHS&G)
The above argument takes as its premise Aristotle’s thesis that, when active, the intellect
is identical to its objects or identical to what it thinks (430a3-4). In a nutshell, the
argument is that if the intellect is like matter, then its nature will be potentially whatever
it comes to be actually, i.e., whatever it thinks. Theophrastus here points out that this
thesis of Aristotle’s has two problematic entailments so long as the intellect is like matter:
(a) since it is not always thinking, it will not always be an intellect and (b) since the
content of one’s intellect is continually changing, the intellect will have a different nature
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from one moment to the next. The problem with conclusion (b) is that the potential
intellect is made to have a nature that is “undiscriminating and disorderly,” though
disorder cannot arise from a nature: it occurs in absence of natures. Natures account for
being and unity, meaning that whatever has a nature has an identity or a being in virtue of
its nature. Thus if, on the one hand, the intellect has a potential nature and a being due to
something other than itself, i.e., its objects, it will not be an intellect when it is not its
objects – when it is not actively thinking. On the other hand, when the intellect is active,
when it is both intellect and things, its nature will be disorderly, changing from one
moment to the next. Both entailments are impossible. Hence, we may conclude that
Theophrastus does not raise these arguments to show that the potential intellect is in need
of the productive intellect. He raises these arguments to show that the mere notion of a
potential intellect is, to use his description at the begin of fragment 312, “absurd.”
To sum: Fragments 307B, 311 and 312 reveal the problem with Barbotin’s and
Devereux’s first assumption, that Theophrastus recognizes a potential intellect.
Theophrastus is at pains to show that there cannot be an intellect whose nature is
potential. Yet without the potential intellect, the theory that the human intellect is a
mixture of two kinds of intellects loses its plausibility, since the mixture is meant to
explain how a potential intellect acquires the agency to think. Nonetheless, let us turn to
consider briefly their second assumption – that “the productive” of 320A and 320B
corresponds to an intellect that lacks all potentiality.
The issue is whether the intellect that enters the human soul from without is the
actual intellect (ejnergeiva/ nou'") that stands in contrast to the intellect
belonging to the soul (yusiko;" nou'"). For we might think, contrariwise, that the

19

intellect from without belongs to the human soul, and stands in contrast to a purely
transcendent intellect in actuality. The two fragments drawn upon are ambiguous on this
matter. Consider the following passage recorded by Themistius, as quoted previously.
For if the potentiality is like a disposition (eij me;n ga;r wJ" e{xi" hJ
duvnami"), if it was connate (suvmfuto") with that, it must have been so
both immediately and always: but if (it came) later, with what, and in what way,
was its coming to be? Certainly it appears to be uncreated, if it is indestructible.
But since it is immanent, why is it not always (ejnupavrcwn, d j ou\n
dia; tiv oujk ajeiv)? Why are there forgetting and deception? Perhaps
through the mixture (h] dia; th;n mi'xin).30 (In de an. 102,26-29 =
320B FHS&G)
Theophrastus here affirms that the intellect is uncreated and indestructible, and hence that
it is not generated by biological causes. Thus, following Aristotle, Theophrastus
describes this intellect as e[xwqen (In de an. 107,32 = 307A). Furthermore,
Theophrastus assumes this intellect to belong to the individual immediately and always.
Two puzzles subsequently arise. “Why is it not always?” and “Why are there forgetting
and deception.” These puzzles are answered by the mixture.
The question “Why is it not always?” (dia; tiv oujk ajeiv) is thought to
allude to the puzzle Aristotle leaves unanswered at the end of De Anima III 4: “the cause
for why thinking is not always” (430a5-6). Hence the question is typically glossed as
“Why does it not always think?” and is taken to imply a time when the productive
intellect thinks continuously and lacks potentiality. Yet there is a way of understanding
this question that neither supplies missing words nor reaches outside the passage.

30

Translations of fragments are from W. FORTENBAUGH, P. HUBY, R. SHARPLES, D.
GUTAS (edd.), Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence,
Part Two, Leiden 1992. For ease of reference, I shall henceforth refer to the fragments by the
numbers assigned to them in this sourcebook.
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The question at the end of 320B, “Why is it not always?” mirrors an implication
of the intellect’s immanency articulated earlier in the passage. “If it was connate with
that,” he writes, “it must have been so both immediately and always.” It is likely, then,
that the query harkens back, not to Aristotle’s question of why thinking for us is
intermittent, but to the supposition that the intellect is present always. The worry is that
if the intellect is connate, and, hence, present immediately, then the embryo at first
generation will be possessed of an intellect. Indeed, this is a worry that really must be
addressed.
It is important to note that this rendering of the question does not imply that the
intellect from without lacks potentiality.31 And this is a good thing, since it preserves the
consistency of the passage. The fragment, after all, affirms that the intellect from without
manifests potentiality: Its “potentiality,” we are told, “is like a disposition” (eij me;n
ga;r wJ" e{xi" hJ duvnami", In de an. 102,26 = 320B). Still, this is not the
only place where Theophrastus attributes potentiality to this intellect. In the following
fragment preserved by Themistius, Theophrastus assumes the intellect from without to
manifest potentiality. He writes:
In what way is it that the intellect, while coming from outside and being as it were
superposed, is yet connate? And what is its nature? For that it is nothing actually,
but everything potentially, is well said, as is also the case with sense. For it must
not be taken in this way, that it is not even itself – for that is captious – but as a
certain underlying potentiality, as is also the case with material objects. But the
‘coming from outside’ must be interpreted not as being superposed, but as being
included with it at its original generation. (In de an. 107,32-37 = 307A FHS&G)

31

Even if the suggested reading is not accepted, there is another reason for denying that the
query “Why does it not always think?” is directed towards an intellect that is pure actuality.
Aristotle raised this question at the end of book three chapter four, i.e., before the introduction of
the productive intellect. His worry, then, was not directed towards an intellect that lacks all
potentiality.
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The issue here regards the nature of the intellect from without. Theophrastus
suggests that this intellect has potentiality as a material object. Therefore, the intellect
from without cannot be the ever active, purely actual productive intellect, as conceived
by both Barbotin and Devereux. We may conclude, then, that Theophrastus does not
recognize two kinds of intellects that mix or co-mingle within the human soul. Indeed,
the fragments suggest the opposite – namely, that the intellect, for Theophrastus, is a
single entity. Notice that the question is always, “What is its nature?” From the
discussion so far, it is clear that his answer will aim to account for its potentiality and
actuality. I will attempt at a fuller explanation of Theophrastus’ noetic theory in the final
section of this essay, but let us now turn to the notion, so far addressed just briefly, that
the intellect manifests mixture insofar as it possesses two functionally discrete powers.

V
According to both Devereux and Moraux, Theophrastus’ mixed intellect is
comprised of discrete functional parts: a productive part, which actualizes intelligible
forms (or produces universal concepts) as a kind of pre-rational power, and a potential
part, which receives and thinks them. This understanding of Theophrastus reflects a
fairly common interpretation of De Anima III 4 and 5 born out of Aristotle’s claim that
thinking is analogous to sensing insofar as the intellect is related to its objects just as the
sense faculties are related to theirs (429a17-18). On the face of it, this analogy is quite
peculiar since the sensible and intelligible objects are, prior to being cognized,
disanalogous. While sensible forms are actual prior to being sensed, the intelligible
forms are potential prior to being thought.

22

Sensible forms of material objects are the so-called proper objects: colors, tastes,
sounds, smells and the tactile qualities. Aristotle is a realist about the sensibles; in his
view, they exist in the world as we experience them. For instance, Aristotle would
explain that an apple is red and sweet independent of our perception of it and, therefore,
the cause of our sensual experiences. As Aristotle explains it, sensing occurs when the
sense-faculty is moved by sensible forms to become like them (418a3-6). Intelligible
forms, by contrast, are potential prior to being thought because they do not have existence
separate from and independent of material objects (432a3-6). Therefore, because these
forms are entrenched in material conditions and because matter is not intelligible in and
of itself, the forms must somehow be rendered intelligible by the intellect in order to be
thought as a universal concept. The intellect must, then, produce or actualize intelligible
forms, which makes thinking active: we can think what we want, when we want because
thinking is up to us (417b21-27).
Some scholars, following Aquinas, want to reconcile the disanalogy between the
objects of the senses and intellect by postulating two discrete faculties: one that produces
the intelligible objects, the other that receives them. On the suppositions that (a) thinking
takes place when the intellect is affected by its objects and (b) the intellect cannot be
affected by what is potential and material, it is held that the intelligible must be made
actual and immaterial in order to precipitate thinking. Accordingly, because the potential
intellect is thought to lack the agency to render our sense-experiences intelligible, the
productive intellect is given the role of producing intelligible objects as a pre-rational
power capable of abstraction or dematerialization, while the potential intellect is given
the role of receiving them. Hence, on such a view the analogy between thinking and
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sensing holds – at least between the sense faculty and the potential intellect – yet thinking
nevertheless remains active.
However, this interpretation is deeply problematic. Not only does this theory
makes the acquisition of form by the cognizer a mysterious and immediate process – a
process that cannot account very well for error or the realities of learning – its causal
account of intellection does not stand up to scrutiny. What is problematic is the
underlying assumption that the intelligible object must be made actual in order to bring
about intellection because the potentially intelligible is a material particular incapable of
affecting the intellect. The trouble is that an immaterial intelligible is an actual thought;
in the case of things without matter, what is thought and what thinks are the same (430a34). If, then, the intelligible needs to be immaterial in order to affect the potential intellect,
it will be an actual thought prior to the intellect thinking it. Surely this cannot be.32
Given both the difficulties of this view and its frequent attribution to the
Peripatetic philosophers, it is all the more important to determine whether or not
Theophrastus espoused it.33 The place to begin is with Theophrastus’ response to the
analogy, for he was evidently puzzled by it. Priscian records his concern as follows:
For it <the intellect> must be <affected> if it is going to come into activity like
the senses. But what is the effect produced on an incorporeal thing by an
incorporeal thing, or of what kind is the alteration? And is the starting-point from
that <the object> or from itself? For by being affected it would seem to be from
32

There is reason to believe that Theophrastus took note of this problem. After critiquing
the analogy and denying that the intellect is passive, Theophrastus asks: “in what way is an
intelligible thing affected by an intelligible thing?” (PRISC. Metaphr. 28,29 = 307D). Given the
preceding discussion, we can assume that this question is a response the suggestion that the
intellect is passively affected. Thus, the question suggests that Theophrastus takes this
conception of the intellect to be problematic, presumably because objects are intelligible only
when thought.
33
The theory of abstraction or dematerialization has been attributed to Alexander of
Aphrodisias and Themistius as well. I very much doubt that either of these philosophers held
such a view.
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that <the object> (tw/' me;n ga;r pavscein ajp j ejkeivnou
dovxeien a[n); for none of the things that are being affected <acts> of itself;
but by being the starting-point of everything and thinking in its power, and not as
with the senses, <it would seem to be> from itself (tw/' de; ajrch;
pavntwn ei\nai kai; ejf j eJautw/' to; noei'n, kai;
mh; w{sper tai'" aijsqhvsesin, ajf j eJautou'). (Metaphr.
27, 9-14 = 307C FHS&G)
Theophrastus appears to deny that thinking conforms to the causal structure of sensing
for two reasons: (a) only sensible objects can cause or be the subject of alteration (an
allusion to Physics VII 3) and (b) the intelligible objects cannot be the starting point of
thinking. This latter objection has two components. The first pertains to the ontological
priority of the intellect. The intellect, the argument goes, cannot be brought to activity by
the intelligible objects without subordinating it to the intelligibles, as Plato does. The
second objection pertains to the active nature of thinking. Thinking, we are told, cannot
be brought to activity by something other than itself, for the reason that if the objects
were the cause of the intellect’s activity, then thinking would cease to be ejf j
eJautw'/. Yet thinking is ejf j eJautw/'.
Theophrastus’ objections to the analogy can certainly be answered by a theory of
abstraction or dematerialization. Still, there is no indication that he held such a view –
quite the opposite. Not only does Theophrastus typically avoid the verb pavscein (to
be affected) and its cognates when discussing the intellect, but he is clearly
uncomfortable with the description paqhtikov".34 Theophrastus addresses the
intellect’s passivity in a discussion that follows immediately upon his critique of the
analogy between thinking and sense-perceiving. Admitting that the intellect cannot be
34

Theophrastus prefers to characterize the intellect as becoming its objects (givnetai).
See, for instance, Metaphr. 29,18 =311 FHS&G; 31,8 = 316 FHS&G; and 37,24-5 = 319
FHS&G. He only uses the adjective paqhtikov" when challenging the intellect’s passivity.
See, for instance, fragments 307A, 307D and 317 FHS&G.
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wholly impassive (ajpaqhv") – presumably for the reason that only the divine is
impervious to all kinds of change – Theophrastus cautions us not thereby to affirm its
passivity. The intellect is not appropriately described as passive, “unless,” he writes,
“‘capable of being affected’ (to; paqhtikovn) is not taken as ‘capable of being
moved’ (to; kinhtikovn)…but as activity (ejnevrgeia)” (Metaphr. 28, 21-22 =
307D).
Indeed, the evidence for the view that the intellect is comprised of functional parts
is weak. Moraux, in fact, does not appeal to any passages beyond those that challenge
the analogy of thinking to sense-perceiving and admits that one must conjecture as to
Theophrastus’ response to his challenges. Devereux’s main piece of evidence comes
from a passage recorded by Priscian. It reads as follows:
For when it <the intellect> has become each thing in the sense in which one is
said actually to know them and we say that this happens when it is able to
actualize through itself (di j eJautou'), then too it is potential in a way, but
not in the same way as before having learned and found out. By what, then, is
this becoming brought about, and how? Well, it is either by disposition and
potentiality, or by substance (ei[t jou\n e{xew" kai; dunavmew"
ei[te oujsiva"). It seems to be more by disposition, and this as it were
perfects the nature <of the intellect> (e[oike de; ma'llon e{xew",
au{th de; oi|on teleou'n th;n fuvsin). (Metaphr. 31,8-13 = 316
FHS&G)
The question raised here is: What accounts for the intellect’s becoming the intelligible
objects as it does when it actually knows them? Theophrastus explains that one is
actually a knower when one’s intellect is able to actualize through itself. At this point,
the intellect is still potential, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering.
Theophrastus offers two possible answers before presenting his conclusion: “it is either
by disposition and potentiality or by substance” that the intellect is brought to actuality.
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The answer he gives in the subsequent line is that the intellect perfects itself by a e{xi",
a disposition.
Devereux takes Theophrastus’ claim that the intellect is perfected by a e{xi" to
reference the productive intellect because Aristotle, in De Anima III 5, describes the
productive intellect as a e{xi" like light (430a15). Devereux assumes that our e{xi"
is responsible for the intellect’s ability to think di j eJautou' on the assumption
that di j eJautou' characterizes its ability to acquire knowledge of the forms. This
is not, however, what the passage says. Di j eJautou' describes the condition under
which we say that someone is an actual knower. A person, we are told, knows when his
intellect is able to actualize its knowledge by itself –i.e., without the aid of external
recourses. Hence, the question Theophrastus asks is: What accounts for the intellect
becoming its objects after it has acquired knowledge? How do we characterize the
intellect when it is capable of thinking di j eJautou'? And his answer is that an
intellect possessed of knowledge has a e{xi", a disposition for thinking. Given, then,
the paucity of evidence for the theory that the potential and productive were perceived as
discrete functional parts of the intellect, there is no compelling reason to saddle
Theophrastus with such a difficult view.

VI
I have so far argued that the duality and division attributed to Theophrastus is not
supported by the fragments. Yet our main question remains unanswered. We still want
to know what Theophrastus means by describing the intellect as a mixture of the potential
and productive – i.e., what he takes these two descriptions “the potential” and “the
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productive” to denote. We may reasonably suppose that the description of the intellect as
a mixture is given as the final answer to Theophrastus’ progressive queries, so long as we
assume Priscian’s meta-commentary to reflect the order of his treatise. Therefore, I
propose to unpack this description of the intellect by considering the questions that lead
him to this conclusion.
The first five fragments on the intellect preserved by Priscian (307B, 307C, 307D,
311 and 312) all concern its nature. 307B, 307C and 307D considers the intellect, should
it have the nature of matter – a nature that is both potential and passive. The fragments
highlight five descriptions given in De Anima III 4 and 5 that would lead one to this
conclusion. In III 4, Aristotle tells us that (i) the intellect has no nature of itself other
than that of potential (mhd j aujtou' ei\nai fuvsin mhdemivan ajll j
h] tauvthn, o{ti dunatov", 429a21-2); (ii) the intellect is nothing in actuality
before it thinks (oujqevn ejstin ejnergeiva/ tw'n o[ntwn pri;n
noei'n, 429a24); and (iii) thinking is analogous to sensing because the intellect relates
to its objects just as the senses to theirs (to; noei'n w{sper to;
aijsqavnesqai...w{sper to; aijsqhtiko;n pro;" ta;
aijsqhtav, ou{tw to;n nou'n pro;" ta; nohtav, 429a13-18). The
implications of these remarks appear to be affirmed in III 5, wherein (iv) Aristotle
compares an intellect to matter (ejsti; to; me;n u{lh...tou'to de; o}
pavnta dunavmei ejkei'na, 430a10-11) and (v) describes it as paqhtikov"
(430a24).
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Theophrastus challenges remarks (i), (ii) and (iv) in fragment 307B.35 Here he
insists that the intellect is a tovde ti, “what else would it be?” and therefore denies
(i) – that the intellect has a potential nature like matter. Furthermore, in denying (i) and
(iv), he rejects (ii) – the idea that the intellect is nothing before it thinks. If the intellect
were nothing before it thinks, then before it thinks it would be characterized only in
virtue of its potentiality.
In the subsequent fragment, 307C, Theophrastus disputes the idea that the
intellect is, like the senses, passively affected by its objects (iii). The analogy is
problematic, as we saw, because it gives ontological priority to the objects of thought and
precludes the intellect’s ability to think ejf j eJautw/' (from itself). Theophrastus
turns in the next recorded fragment (307D) to respond to the anticipated objection that the
intellect must be paqhtikov" on the grounds that if it is wholly impassive it would
think nothing. He answers by explaining that if we must use the adjective paqhtikov"
to describe the human intellect (since it is evidently not wholly impassive), then its
important to understand that it is not paqhtikov" in the sense of being moved
(kinhtikov") by the objects of thought. For how, he goes on to say, is an intelligible
thing affected by an intelligible (pw'" nohto;n uJpo; nohtou' pavscei,
Metaphr. 28,29 = 307D)?
The difficulty is that if the intellect’s nature is not tied to its potentiality, neither is
it tied to what it is in actuality. This is made clear in fragments 311 and 312. The
argument articulated between these two fragments takes as its premises that, when active,
the intellect is identical to its objects (430a3-4). The problem is that if the intellect is an
Perhaps “challenge” is too leading of a verb. But we can say, at the very least, that he
challenges a literally reading of these descriptions.
35
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intellect most of all when it is active, and intellect, when it is active, is identical to what it
thinks, then when thinking intellect’s nature will be “undiscriminating and disorderly,”
and when not, it will not have a nature and so not even be itself. Both conclusions are
evidently absurd. Therefore, what the intellect is cannot be explained on appeal to its
activity.
The focused objections of the first five fragments indicate that Theophrastus’
interest is to explain the intellect’s nature. This is evidenced further by the fact that when
he does give his description of the intellect as mixture, it is prefaced by the question:
“What are these two natures?” (in de an. 108, 22-3 = 320 A). Theophrastus’ challenge is
to give an account of the intellect’s nature in light of the fact that it must be all of its
objects potentially, and actually the very object it thinks. The problem is that if the
intellect is all things potentially but nothing actually, then it lacks form and being. Thus,
his challenge is to explain what accounts for and persists through the intellect’s activities:
i.e., to explain an infant’s ability to learn or what allows us to say that she has an intellect
prior to acquiring forms and to explain how the intellect that has learned does not change
its nature from one thought to the next.
Theophrastus is left with little option. He has shown that the intellect’s nature is
tied neither to its potentiality nor to its actuality. Presumably, then, it must be tied to its
e{xi", disposition. Indeed, the intellect’s disposition is the focus of the very next fragment
preserved by Priscian. Here in fragment 316, Theophrastus explains that the intellect
becomes its objects thanks to a disposition, not a substance (such as a Platonic form).
This proposal solves the above-described problems. It is easy to see how tying the
intellect’s nature to its disposition will solve the second problem: namely, how the
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intellect can remain one and the same through its various activities. For the disposition of
the intellect to think does not change with the changes in its activity and it is not lost
when the intellect ceases to think. What is harder to explain is how this proposal solves
the problem of the infant’s intellect, but recall that the problem arises on the assumptions
that the intellect is nothing before it thinks and that it thinks by becoming its objects.
These two theses suggest that the intellect’s nature is tied to what it thinks. However, if
the intellect is defined by its objects, then it will not be an intellect prior to acquiring a
relationship to them. That is why on such a view an infant will not have an intellect prior
to thinking the objects. By contrast, if the intellect is defined by a disposition intrinsic
and natural to it, then it can be an intellect even before its disposition is fully developed.
Indeed, an infant has a capacity to think from birth: a capacity that develops both
naturally from experience and also through rigorous training. Thus I contend that for
Theophrastus the intellect’s nature corresponds, not to what it thinks, but to its ability to
think: its ability to render the world intelligible in active contemplation.
We can now return to the description of the intellect as a mixture of the potential
and productive. My suggestion is that this description refers to the intellect’s nature
insofar as a disposition reflects both potentiality and productivity. Hence, my claim is
that “the productive and the potential” refers, neither to distinct intellects nor to opposing
noetic powers, but to the very same thing: an acquired ability to render the world
intelligible in active contemplation. Indeed, Theophrastus’ use of the participle
sunhrthmevnon (“what is united to”) to describe the relationship between the
potential and the productive (In de an. 108,23 = 320A) speaks to this suggestion. Huby,
in her commentary on the fragments, notes that Galen contrasts sunhrth'sqai with
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sumfuvesqhai.36 She reports that sumfuvesqhai is used to describe the growing
together of distinct things, while sunhrth'sqai is used to describe things are that are
intimately united. The use of sunhrthmevnon thereby points to the unity of the
productive and potential just as Theophrastus’ insistence that the intellect’s potentiality is
comparable to that of a material object (Metaphr. 25,28 = 307B). A material object
manifests both potentiality (matter) and actuality (form) because it can be described from
different perspectives. Considered from one aspect, a house is materially bricks and
mortar; considered from another, it is form and arrangement. Yet the house’s shape does
not stand apart from its bricks and mortar. “Mortar and brick” and “shape and
arrangement” offer two different descriptions of the same thing.37 Likewise, the
disposition that the intellect has to actualize its objects in active contemplation is none
other than the ability it has to become its objects.
If this understanding of the fragments is correct, we have an interpretation of why
Theophrastus uses the term ‘mixture’ to describe the relationship between “the
productive” and “the potential.” On the interpretation here offered, the application of the
description ‘mixture’ to the intellect is not meant to emphasize the intellect’s duality. But
let us recall that a genuine mixture does not result in duality, but uniformity: all parts of a
mixture are alike. This, then, is what I take Theophrastus to emphasize with the notion of
the intellect as a mixture: not differentiation and division, but uniformity, singularity and
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P. HUBY, Commentary, cit., pp. 184-85.
We might note how ill suited Devereux’s and Moraux’s conception of the intellect is to
make sense of Theophrastus’ comparison of the potentiality of the intellect to the potentiality of
material objects. On their view, the potential intellect has an actuality apart from the activity of
the productive intellect. The potential intellect actualizes when it becomes an actual thought.
Hence, on their view the intellect has two actualities: the actuality of the potential intellect and
the actuality of the productive intellect.
37
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wholeness. The intellect may admit of different descriptions, but ultimately they are of
the same thing.
To some, this interpretation of Theophrastus must sound deeply problematic. On
the interpretation just now given, the potential intellect (the intellect that is none of its
objects in actuality) has by its very nature the ability to acquire (and not simply to
receive) the intelligible objects. This is a treatment of III 4 that is believed to be first
proposed by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his own De Anima, the subject of Moraux’s
doctoral thesis. At that time, Moraux thought ludicrous Alexander’s theory that the
potential intellect perfects itself. It is for this reason that Moraux writes that we must
look towards Theophrastus and Aquinas for a more faithful and coherent treatment of
Aristotle.38 This study of Theophrastus places him much more in line with Alexander
than Aquinas and makes dubious the distinction between Theophrastus’ immanent
interpretation of De Anima III 5 and Alexander’s transcendent reading. Theophrastus
certainly takes “the productive” to describe an aspect of the human intellect, but their
conception of the human intellect is not far apart. Furthermore, Theophrastus insists that
we need to understand the human intellect in reference to the divine (Metaphr. 26,5-6 =
307B), leaving room for us to speculate on the precise relationship of the two.
I do not mean to suggest, however, that Theophrastus and Alexander offer the
more faithful approach to the De Anima. It is very hard to determine Theophrastus’
motives, but on my reading, Theophrastus arrived at his interpretation by rejecting the
following of Aristotle’s doctrines or descriptions (at least when taken at face value): (i)
About Alexander’s conception of the intellect, Moraux writes: « La contradiction interne
du système est flagrant: à cette faculté qui « n’a d’autre essence que d’être en puissance »… on
attribue des opérations, telles que l’abstraction et la connaissance ; on lui accorde la possibilité de
se meubler de formes, comme si, dans le cas de la tablette, c’était le non écrit lui-même, qui se
couvrait d’écriture !». P. MORAUX, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, cit., p. 75.
38
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the intellect has no nature of itself other than that of potential (429a21-2); (ii) the intellect
is nothing in actuality before it thinks (429a24); (iii) thinking is analogous to sensing
because the intellect relates to its objects just as the senses to theirs (429a13-18); (iv) the
intellect is comparable to matter (430a10-11); and (v) it is aptly described by the
adjective paqhtikov" (430a24). We need not think that Theophrastus takes all these
remarks literally. He gives a feeble explanation of why we might be forced to describe
the intellect as paqhtikov" in 307D and he could have easily read (ii) as the claim that
the intellect is none of its objects before it thinks. However, (i), (iii) and (iv) are a
different story, since he does not provide us with a satisfactory way of understanding
these odd remarks. Thus, there is reason to believe that Theophrastus went beyond
clarifying Aristotle’s De Anima III 4 and 5 – that in his mind he transformed it.39
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